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Despite Schopenhauer's greatness as an original 
philosophical mind, and despite his sincere and pro-
found admiration for Kant and the Critical philosophy, 
he remains a most unreliable interpreter of the work of 
Kant. Time and again in his criticisms of Kant's phi-
losophy, both in its theoretical and practical aspects, 
Schopenhauer betrays a significant lack in his grasp of 
Critical principles. Nowhere is this lack more clearly 
evident than in his rejection, in The Fourfold Root of 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason, 1 of the analysis 
and proof of the causal principle put forward by Kant 
in the Critique of Pure Reason. 1 This section of the 
Critique is extremely important, for not only does it 
contain some of the finest and most subtle argumenta-
tion in the entire work, but it also represents Kant's 
rebuttal of Hume's skeptical attack on the causal con-
nection, an attack which was certainly instrumental in 
giving rise to the Critical philosophy itself. In a 
sense, Kant's causal argument epitomizes the Critical 
approach as a whole, and we should look very carefully 
at someone who, like Schopenhauer, claims kinship with 
Kant, but who at the same time rejects the Kantian an-
alysis of cause and effect. We should try to be sure 
that such a rejection does not constitute a return to a 
pre-Critical dogmatism, albeit one expressed in the 
language of transcendental philosophy. 
My procedure in what follows will be to outline the 
problem of causality as it was bequeathed to Kant by 
his modern predecessors, particularly Descartes, Locke, 
and Hume, and then to look at the respective solutions 
to the problem provided by Kant and Schopenhauer. 
Finally, I will try to determine whether Schopenhauer 
is justified in his rejection of Kant's solution, that 
is, whether he has properly understood Kant's argument, 
and whether he has something more adequate to offer in 
its place. 
A treatment of causality is termed "dogmatic," when 
the necessity traditionally held to pertain to the 
causal connection is incorrectly grounded or assumed 
without adequate justification. The modern pre-Crit-
ical causal dogmatism manifested itself in two ways. 
First, the causal connection was understood as a form 
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of logical entailment, or logical ground and con-
sequent. Second, the causal principle, that every 
change must have a cause, was held to be self-evident 
and a priori. In terms of the Cartesian epistemology 
whicii dominated the 17th century, the causal principle 
was an innate possession of the mind, along with other 
self-evident principles such as the principle of non-
contradiction. For those of an empiricist persuasion 
who denied the existence of such innate ideas, who held 
that the causal principle was not a priori and self-
evident, but arose from experience (Locke); and who saw 
that the causal connection had to be understood as 
other than a relation of logical entailment, since con-
trary connections could be conceived without contradic-
tion (Hume), the only apparently consistent course was 
to relinquish the a priority and necessity of the caus-
al principle, as well as the necessity of the connec-
tion between cause and effect. This step was in fact 
taken by Hume. The problem Kant set for himself was to 
preserve the necessity of the causal principle and of 
the causal connection, without relying on any doctrine 
of innate or self-evident principles, and without as-
similating the causal connection to logical entailment. 
Kant'8 solution to the problem takes the following 
form. Instead of a connection of logical entailment he 
suggests a connection between representations within a 
synthetic unity of apperception; and he postulates 
twelve a priori categories, ostensibly derived from 
twelve forms of logical judgment, as rules according to 
which this synthetic connection is to be made. As the 
logical judgments bring lower (less general) concepts 
(representations) under the unity of a higher concept, 
B O do the categories bring representations to the unity 
of apperception. "The same function," says Kant, 
"which gives unity to the various representations in a 
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of var-
ious representations in an intuition; and this unity, 
in its most general expression, we entitle the pure 
concept of the understanding." 1 Causality is, of 
course, included among these categories. Since the 
categories are a priori, the connections they establish 
between representations are necessary, and not contin-
gent, but also not analytic. In this way Kant solves, 
to his own satisfaction, the dual problem of causality. 
Now, it is clear that the conception of the syn-
thetic a priori solves (for Kant) the problem of the 
logical nature of the causal connection. What is not 
so clear is the way in which the notion of a category 
of the understanding is an advance over the notion of 
an innate idea. After all, if the category is a form 
of the understanding, why is it not something innate to 
the understanding? The difference is that Kant does 
not postulate these forms dogmatically, merely calling 
them "self-evident," but argues for them by means of a 
transcendental deduction. Having established the ide-
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ality of space and time in the "Transcendental Aesthet-
ic" by calling attention to the synthetic, yet a priori 
and apodictic nature of geometry and arithmetic, he ar-
gues for the categories as the only possible functions 
by which the manifold of representations intuited in 
space and time can be brought to the unity of appercep-
tion, the unity of the "I think." Since the causal 
category is established in this way, it can only be 
seen as a rule for the connection of representations. 
In addition, because the knowing self, the transcenden-
tal ego, is merely a focus of the formal unity of the 
"I think," it is not a substance which can be said to 
have innate possessions of any kind. 
But the task of justification of the categories, 
while begun in the "Transcendental Deduction," can only 
be fully carried out in the "Analytic of Principles," 
after the schematism has been achieved, in which the 
categories are given spatial and temporal contextual 
meaning. In the "Analogies of Experience," the ex-
panded arguments for the categories of relation, sub-
stance, cause, and reciprocity are ingeniously worked 
out as three interrelated rules for the ordering of re-
presentations in the time-series. Ordering here means 
objective ordering: while representations are said to 
be held together in a serial ordering by synthesis of 
imagination (subjectively) in inner sense, the one ob-
jective series of events can only be established by 
means of rules determining experience for any observer. 
In the Analogies, the First (substance in general) 
grounds a single and continuous time-series, the Second 
(cause and effect) establishes the objective irreversi-
ble order of representations within this series, and 
the Third (reciprocity), by correlating reversible and 
irreversible series of representations establishes rel-
ative stasis and flux among representations thereby es-
tablishing coexistence between empirical substances. 
Now, what is really significant in Kant's Second 
Analogy argument is that he completely ignores the pro-
ductive aspect of cause and interprets it purely as a 
rule for the necessary ordering of representations in 
time. Therefore, he has reversed the usual priority of 
cause and time: rather than regarding cause as arising 
out of the observation of a regular succession of e-
vents (Hume), Kant establishes cause as that which 
makes a regular succession conceivable in the first 
place.* In this way Kant takes into account Hume's in-
sight that the alleged productive connection between 
cause and effect, the "secret power," is a mystery, and 
completely hidden from view, and that all that can be 
observed is a regular succession.* For Kant the causal 
category makes experience of regular succession possi-
ble, and is our means for distinguishing our subjective 
serial apprehension of representations from an objec-
tive series, one that is interpreted as alterations in 
the state of an object or objects. The causal category 
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is the basis upon which we distinguish objective empir-
ical truth from the subjective play of fancy. But more 
importantly for our present purposes, it is also the 
basis for postulating the existence of an empirical ob-
ject. As Kant himself puts it, 
How, then does it come about that we posit an ob-
ject for these representations, and so, in addi-
tion to their subjective reality as modifica-
tions, ascribe to them some mysterious kind of 
objective reality. Objective meaning cannot con-
sist in the relation to another representation 
(of that which we desire to entitle object), for 
in that case the question arises, how this latter 
representation goes out beyond itself . . . only 
in so far as our representations are necessitated 
in a certain order as regards their time rela-
tions do they acquire objective meaning.' 
We can see that Schopenhauer's charge that "Kant 
. . . did not clearly see that empirical perception is 
brought about by the law of causality" is not justi-
fied. * Kant does insist, however, that only represen-
tations can be causally connected, because the emplri-
cal object is nothing other than a construct of repre-
sentations. Yet a direct causal inference to a non-
representational object is just what Schopenhauer tries 
to accomplish. He states that cause transforms "sub-
jective sensatibn" into "objective intuitive percep-
tion"; that the understanding grasps a given sensation 
as the effect of an object "outside the organism."* 
The fact that Schopenhauer, in a supposed transcenden-
tal analysis, is already speaking in physiological 
terms should put us on our guard. Let us recall the 
two aspects of the dogmatic conception of cause, the a 
priority of the causal principle and the assumption of 
logical entailment between cause and effect. Having 
observed Kant's method of dealing with them vis-a-vis 
the empiricist critique, let us now see whether Scho-
penhauer has something more adequate to offer in its 
place. 
Schopenhauer construes cause and effect as one 
aspect of what he calls the principle of sufficient 
reason, which states that "nothing is without a ground 
or reason why it is."" Although he takes his own for-
mulation of the principle of sufficient reason from 
Wolff, it derives, of course, from the philosophy of 
Leibniz. Yet Schopenhauer's conception of the prin-
ciple (in its causal aspect) has little in common with 
that of Leibniz, for it is clear that the principle is 
Schopenhauer's way of expressing the Kantian dictum 
that nothing in phenomenal experience can be uncondi-
tioned. But if Schopenhauer is to reject Kantian tran-
scendental logic, the formal schema in terms of which 
Kant expresses such conditionedness, he must offer some 
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other schema in terms of which causal explanation, as a 
species of the principle of sufficient reason, is to be 
conceived, since he follows Hume and Kant in recogniz-
ing that the relation of cause and effect is not one of 
logical ground and consequent. 
There is also evidence that Schopenhauer does not 
really have an adequate conception of what transcenden-
tal logic is. For him, logic and reason are limited to 
what Kant had called "general logic," namely abstrac-
tion from particular sensible intuitions. Schopenhauer 
makes his position clear on many occasions, of which 
the following are good examples. In The Fourfold Root 
he says: 
The only essential difference between human being 
and animal, which from time immemorial has been 
attributed to the faculty of reason (Vernunft), a 
very special cognitive faculty belonging exclu-
sively to man, is based on the fact that he has a 
class of representations not shared by any ani-
mal. They are concepts and thus abstract repre-
sentations, as opposed to the representations of 
intuitive perception, from which they are never-
theless drawn off. *• 
In The World as Will and Representation, he says much 
the same thing, holding that "objects exist primarily 
only for perception, and that concepts are always ab-
stractions from this perception . . . The essential na-
ture of this faculty (of reflection) is the formation 
of concepts, i.e., of abstract non-perceptible repre-
sentations, and this constitutes the sole function of 
our faculty of reason . . ."" Because of this view 
of logic and reason the entire "Transcendental 
Analytic," depending as it does upon a revolutionary 
conception of logic, remains, for Schopenhauer, a 
closed book. Rather than a logic of intensional 
concepts, transcendental logic is a logic of relations, 
and is, in effect, the formal framework of Kant's ver-
sion of the coherence theory of truth. This is perhaps 
the most important epistemological development of the 
Critical philosophy and Kant's solution to the episte-
mological problems created by the development of 
Renaissance metaphysics that culminated in Descartes 
and Locke. 
If the Renaissance development completely over-
turned the Aristotelian physics and metaphysics, the 
older logical and epistemological doctrines continued 
to hold sway. Thus while epochal changes in metaphysi-
cal thinking forced a schismatic separation between 
knowing mind and object to be known; entities, whether 
mental (spiritual) or material, continued to be con-
ceived as substances with attributes, and knowledge 
continued to be thought of as an agreement between 
thought and object (with the notable exception of 
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Berkeley). The Platonic metaphors of light and of 
clear perception for intellectual apprehension (noesls) 
are evident in Descartes' appeal to clear and distinct 
ideas. But the limitation of this approach in the con-
text of a knowing self completely shut off from an 
alien world of lifeless matter becomes evident when we 
observe the philosopher call upon God to invest his 
subjectively clear and distinct ideas with objective 
significance. Because of the aforementioned logical 
bias, relations were thought to be secondary in impor-
tance to attribution. The object of experience, as 
well as the self, were conceived as substances with in-
hering attributes. In the case of the object, such at-
tributes were its qualities; in the case of the self, 
they were its thoughts (representations, ideas, impres-
sions, etc.). 
But we can see that this state of affairs left the 
knowing self certain only of its own immanent repre-
sentations. As Locke says, "since the mind in all its 
thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object 
but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contem-
plate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conver-
sant about them."" But then it is the case that "our 
knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a 
conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. 
But what shall be here the criterion?"" It was Kant's 
insight to substitute for the correspondence conception 
a coherence criterion of truth, and for the substance-
attribute model of the existent, the concept of a con-
struct made up of representational elements in relation 
to one another. Objectivity (empirical truth) is se-
cured by means of a formal standard, rules of synthesis 
(categories) of representations, and the manifold of 
representations as ordered according to these rules in 
public experience is necessarily the same for all ob-
servers and so universal. 
It is precisely this coherence criterion of truth 
in terms of formal ordering of representations, i.e., 
the categoreal scheme, that allows Kant his empirical 
realism in conjunction with a transcendental idealism. 
Because of the rule-governed ordering, empirical ex-
perience appears real. There is no question within the 
consciousness of the experiencing subject as to whether 
any given bit of immanent material is real (objective) 
or not, because not only is its empirical reality in-
cluded in its very form, and not referred to something 
outside immanent experience (Descartes, Locke), but 
this form differentiates the empirically objective from 
mental events which are empirically subjective, some-
thing Berkeley was not able to accomplish. As a conse-
quence, Berkeley reduced all experience to subjective 
ideas within spiritual substance. 
Kant*8 advance over Locke and Berkeley in estab-
lishing a true empirical realism within a transcenden-
tal idealism is thus traceable to his transcendental 
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logic and the categoreal scheme. But Schopenhauer, ac-
cording to his own testimony, rejects Kant's doctrine 
of the categories: "I reject the whole doctrine of the 
categories," he says, "and number it among the ground-
less assumptions with which Kant burdened the theory of 
knowledge." 1* He must therefore reject the transcen-
dental logic, the transcendental deductions, and the 
Kantian coherence criterion of truth. But if he is to 
do so successfully, he must supply some other argument 
designed to show how the causal principle is prior to 
experience, and yet not dogmatically postulated as some 
sort of innate' possession of the mind. He must also 
somehow establish the necessity of the causal con-
nection, and must do so on grounds other than logical 
connection. And once Kant, by means of a modification 
of logic, had made an empirical "transcendence in 
immanence" possible there was no going back to the 
"problematic idealism" of Descartes, or the "dogmatic 
idealism" of Berkeley. These are Kant's own charac-
terizations in the "Refutation of Idealism." Hegel, we 
should point out, by means of a very different modifi-
cation of logic, created a far more radical transcen-
dence in immanence. 
But if we ask whether Schopenhauer has continued 
Kant ' 8 advance, we must answer in the negative, and 
conclude that he has merely provided old wine in new 
bottles. It is not sufficient to merely state in more 
or less Kantian language that cause as a species of 
sufficient reason is a form or function of the intel-
lect. So stated, without anything like a transcen-
dental deduction, it is difficult to see this as any-
thing other than a dogmatic assertion. Schopenhauer's 
answer to this is, of course, that because the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason is a universal demand for 
proof in all instances, one cannot demand that it be 
proven. 1' This may be correct. But that does not ab-
solve one from the task of having to specify for a 
given body of explanation what is to count as adequate 
proof and what is not. Every occurrence demands a 
search for a cause. Locke and Hume admit this. The 
problem is to determine the nature of this demand and 
how we can know that the demand has been met. 
The account Schopenhauer does give of the function 
of the causal principle seems to be a reversion to an 
older conception. His doctrine that subjective sensa-
tion is changed into objective perception through ap-
plication of the causal principle does not appear to be 
different in essentials from Locke's contention that 
judgment "alters the appearances into their causes." 1' 
Yet it is this contention of Locke that is one of 
Hume's principal targets, for he states in the Trea-
tise: "even after we distinguish our perceptions from 
our objects, (it) will appear presently, that we are 
still incapable of reasoning from the existence of one 
to the other." 1' But Schopenhauer has stated in appar-
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ent agreement with Kant, that the law of causality re-
fers exclusively to the appearance and disappearance of 
states of objects in time. "It is wrong to call the 
objects, not the state, the cause."" Yet he says that 
"it is only when my understanding passes from the sen-
sation to the cause thereof that it constructs for it-
self a body having the properties of solidity, impene-
trability, and h a r d n e s s . " Kant, on the other hand, 
carefully distinguishes between substances as the 
source of action in appearances, and cause and effect 
as connecting representations. "Causality leads to the 
concept of action, this in turn to the concept of 
force, and thereby to the concept of substance." 1' 
Such theorizing is an extension of the concept of 
cause, and as the "empirical criterion" of a substance 
it has no place in pure transcendental analysis. 
Causality must be properly grounded before empirical 
concepts such as force or action are introduced. 
When Schopenhauer does speak of the connection of 
representations, he merely states that "all our repre-
sentations stand to one another in a natural and regu-
lar connection that in form is determinable a 
priori."" Now what sort of "form" is this? It is 
evident that Schopenhauer wishes to assert, with Kant, 
a synthetic a priori connection between 
representations. But what is his formal schema? How 
is such synthetic connection established? Since he 
preemptively dismisses Kant's transcendental unity of 
apperception as "a very strange thing strangely 
described," Kant's argument for cause and effect as one 
of the functions by means of which such unity within a 
synthetically connected manifold is achieved is not 
available to him." He cannot, as does Kant, argue for 
a category of cause and effect as a necessary presuppo-
sition of a unified field of experience, and so of any-
thing that can be reasonably termed experience at all. 
This is the significance of a "transcendental 
deduction," and only in this somewhat weakened sense, 
compared to the earlier dogmatism, are the categories 
established a priori. But Schopenhauer appears to of-
fer no argument justifying the principle of sufficient 
reason other than an appeal to alleged self-evidence, 
or to some sort of claim as to the way the "mind" in 
its essential nature operates. All he really supplies 
is a recycling of the Cartesian dogmatism; and he lays 
hands upon the words 'transcendental' and a priori as 
if they were talismans invested with magical explana-
tory powers. 
Furthermore, for Schopenhauer 'transcendental' 
seems to mean merely the appearance of the transcen-
dent, the thing-in-itself, and thus becomes identified 
with the phenomenal. But it is just the form of the 
phenomenal, and not the phenomenon itself. As form, it 
is .not abstracted from the observation of the function 
of the mind, but 1B a framework in terms of which the 
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mind is to be understood in a functional sense. 
Transcendental logic is not a set of laws according to 
which the understanding must function; rather it is the 
understanding itself. The understanding does not exist 
apart from these rules, as something from which they 
can be abstracted, or to which they can be applied. 
Kant does say, it is true, that "the understanding does 
this," or "the imagination does that." But he cannot 
be speaking literally, for the ontological status of 
these "faculties" is problematical. If they are noume-
nal, how can we know anything about them; if phenome-
nal, they themselves are mere appearance, and cannot 
explain appearance. Kant must therefore be using the 
psychological "faculty" language as a model to facili-
tate understanding of the formal structure upon which 
his argument really depends. The transcendental ego is 
not an existent entity in any sense. Transcendental 
idealism, we can therefore see, is a subtle and tricky 
formulation. As a formal construct of mind it differs 
fundamentally from the metaphysical idealisms that had 
gone before, and great care must be taken to keep the 
transcendental and the empirical selves, or "egos," 
separate. 
Finally, Schopenhauer's adoption of the Kantian 
distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself can 
be seen to create additional problems for him. By in-
terpreting the thing-in-itself as will, Schopenhauer is 
forced to reduce the empirical world and the empirical 
self to mere appearances of the will. The world is the 
way the will appears under the forms of intellect; but 
because of the conflation of the empirical and tran-
scendental selves, this intellect and its forms are 
themselves merely appearance. Recognizing the untena-
bility of the concept of soul or spiritual substance of 
Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley, but rejecting Kant's 
conception of the transcendental self as a formal unit, 
Schopenhauer has no alternative but to see the knowing 
self either as empirical or as thing-in-itself. In a 
sense he does both: the intellect is in actuality the 
will-to-know, and only as represented and objectified, 
the brain. But the will-to-know cannot be directly ex-
perienced; it can only be lived. As subjectively ob-
served through introspection it is also phenomenon. 
Therefore both intellect as subjectively experienced 
and brain as objectively perceived are phenomena. 
"Matter is the representation of the intellect; the in-
tellect is that in the representation of which alone 
matter exists. Both together constitute the world as 
representation, which is precisely Kant's phenomenon, 
and consequently something secondary. What is primary 
is that which appears, namely the thing-in-itself, 
which we shall afterwards learn to recognize as the 
will."** But if the intellect is phenomenon its forms 
are not really transcendental, belonging to another or-
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der> they are phenomenal, and as such, they cannot es-
tablish themselves, but are swallowed up in illusion. 
Schopenhauer'8 position, however is self-defeating: 
the work of the understanding, equated with the func-
tioning of the brain, is presented both as conditioning 
experience, and as appearance itself. It is as if 
Schopenhauer took too literally Kant's psychological 
language in the First Edition "Transcendental Deduc-
tion" and took Kant to be actually describing the func-
tioning of the mind in a psychological sense, or of the 
thinking organ, the brain, in a physiological sense, 
rather than presenting a heuristic model. It is, of 
course, well known that Schopenhauer greatly preferred 
the 1st Edition to the 2nd. When criticizing Kant's 
conception of a moral law in The Basis of Morality 
Schopenhauer says "if . . . his alleged moral law orig-
inates a priori in our head, it must likewise be only a 
form of the phenomenon."'* We clearly see here Scho-
penhauer's refusal (or inability) to separate the tran-
scendental from the empirical subjective. The tran-
scendental a priori does not originate "in our head"; 
on the contrary, our head and brain, with their empir-
ical contents, originate within it. 
Consequently Schopenhauer's idealism is strangely 
perverse: on the one hand it 1B dogmatic, in that it 
posits without justification innate forms that are sup-
posed to pertain a priori to the knowing self; but on 
the other hand it is ephemeral, because the knowing 
self and its functions are phenomenal, and do not 
really attain transcendental status. Although Schopen-
hauer has rejected the metaphysical conception of spir-
itual substance, in which thoughts as representations 
or ideas "inhere," he has not provided a new conception 
of mind at all, as did Kant and Hegel. Rather, he has 
merely substituted a metaphysical substratum of energy 
as will, for the old metaphysics of substance. But 
mind, now degraded to mere phenomenon, functions in a 
way that reverts to the older conceptions of Descartes 
and Locke, amalgamating the innate possession doctrine 
of the former with the more empirical tendencies of the 
latter. But the influence of Berkeley, whom Schopen-
hauer admired, is discernible as well, for unlike Des-
cartes and Locke, Schopenhauer regards primary as well 
as secondary qualities of objects as "subjective." 
Schopenhauer repeatedly encourages the following mis-
leading comparison between Locke and Kant: 
. . . just as Locke claimed for the organs of 
sense all that comes into perception or apprehen-
sion by means of sensation, in order to deny it 
to things in themselves, so Kant, with the same 
purpose and pursuing the same path, showed every-
thing that makes real perception possible, namely 
space, time, and causality to be brain func-
tion." 
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Schopenhauer goes on to say: "He |Kant J refrained, 
however, from using this physiological expression."" 
One would hope so! 
Because his argument is not really transcendental, 
and because his approach is so thoroughly. un-Critical, 
Schopenhauer is Kantian only in so far as he takes over 
the conception of phenomenon and thing-in-itself. But 
his adoption of the Kantian terminology has served to 
render his entire enterprise self-defeating: for he is 
forced, as Locke, Berkeley, and Descartes were not, to 
regard intellect and reason themselves as phenomenal. 
But this calls his whole philosophy as a rational ac-
count into question; and even if we apply a "throw away 
the ladder once one has reached the goal" interpreta-
tion, all Schopenhauer tells us seems to be reduced to 
appearance and illusion. But perhaps, given his pre-
dilection for Eastern thought, he did mean something 
like this. And if we take seriously the dialectical 
reversal with which he ends the First Volume of The 
World as Will and Repreaentation, he may have truly 
believed all rational apprehension to be illusion, and 
the real to be the "Prajna-Paramita," the "beyond all 
knowledge" of the Buddhists. 1 7 
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